Decentralized resource allocation is a key prob lem for large-scale autonomic (or self-managing) computing systems. Motivated by a data center scenario, we explore efficient techniques for re solving resource conflicts via cooperative nego tiation. Rather than computing in advance the functional dependence of each element's utility upon the amount of resource it receives, which could be prohibitively expensive, each element's utility is elicited incrementally. Such incremen tal utility elicitation strategies require the evalu ation of only a small set of sampled utility func tion points, yet they find near-optimal allocations with respect to a minimax regret criterion. We describe preliminary computational experiments that illustrate the benefit of our approach.
Introduction
The long-term goal of autonomic computing is to develop systems that can manage themselves with little or no human intervention [7] . Such systems must possess the ability to configure themselves, monitor performance and adapt to changing circumstances, self-optimize, and diagnose and repair problems. In large, distributed computing systems, such autonomy will generally require the continuous allo cation and re-allocation of resources (e.g., compute cycles or storage) to distinct computing elements. As we elaborate below, the reasoning required to support optimal resource allocation is necessarily distributed, thus requiring some form of cooperative negotiation among the computing el ements that have conflicting needs for critical resources.
To motivate our approach, we consider the task of an au tomated resource manager, or provisioner, allocating re sources to various workload managers (WMs). Each WM,
given a specifi c allocation of resources, must decide how best to use those resources to service various client con tracts. As a result, the utility of a specifi c allocation level to a WM often depends on the solution of a complex op timization problem. The provisioner's task is to allocate resources to the WMs in a way that total (organizational) utility is maximized. However, since the individual WM utility functions are complex and have no closed form generally, even the computation of a single utility point in the WM function is complex and very expensive-it is in feasible to communicate entire utility functions directly to the provisioner. We develop a model for distributed, cooperative negotia tion in which the provisioner interacts with WMs through a form of incremental utility elicitation. In our model, the provisioner asks WMs for samples of their utility function at certain critical allocation levels. We describe techniques by which the provisioner can allocate resources based on this partial utility information. Because distributional in formation over utility functions is hard to obtain, we use a distribution-free model, maximum regret, to measure the quality of such an allocation. We describe computational methods for computing max regret, as well as methods for computing (and approximating) allocations with minimal max (minimax) regret. We also describe several elicitation methods that are guaranteed to offer improvement in deci sion quality in the worst case, and that, in practice, improve worst-case decision quality very quickly.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section 2 we describe the resource allocation problem for a data center with multiple WMs, using this to motivate the more general model that follows. We argue that this problem should viewed as a form of cooperative negoti ation, and solved using incremental utility elicitation, in Section 3. In Section 4, we formalize our model, and present exact and approximate algorithms to compute allo cations with minimax regret given a set of partially known WM utility functions. In Section 5, we describe incremen tal elicitation strategies designed to reduce minimax regret, and present results demonstrating the effectiveness of these strategies in Section 6 using the data center model. We conclude in Section 7 with a discussion of future research directions.
Resource Allocation in an Autonomic System
We begin by describing the class of tasks that motivates this research, namely, the problem of resource allocation in au tonomic systems. In this section, we provide a description of the basic task, while in Section 3 we argue that using in cremental utility elicitation provides an appropriate means to facilitate the negotiation for resources among coopera tive elements in an autonomic system. The formal details of our model will be introduced in Section 4.
An autonomic computing system is designed to drasti cally reduce the role of human administrators by automat ing most of the managerial decision making required in the operation of a complex computing environment [7] .
Automated resource allocation, in particular, is necessary for an autonomic system to optimize its performance and adapt to failures that reduce resource availability. In large, distributed autonomic systems, resource allocation occurs at multiple scopes. Local allocation decisions will be made within individual elements (servers, databases, stor age units, etc.) and small clusters of elements. Local clus ters will contend for pools of resources in the larger do main, or across administrative domains. Although elements in an autonomic system of a single corporation will gen erally be cooperative (sharing the goal of optimizing total business value), the complexity of local information often precludes centralized allocation across the entire system.
Cooperative negotiation, using preference elicitation tech niques, can serve as an effective approach to decentralizing the problem.
To motivate the problem, consider resource allocation within a data center. Because the distribution of client demand changes over 1 Our algorithms do not depend on the specific data center sce nario we study. Indeed, the algorithms are applicable to a broad class of cooperative distributed allocation problems. indicates maximum utility to A as a function of a A. Curve "Provider B" indicates maximum utility to B as a function of as. Curve "Total" indicates total utility as a function of a A provided to A (with a-a A provided to 8).
time, the data center provisioner will periodically reallocate resources between the WMs. Letting i range over WMs, the resource allocation problem for the provisioner is to compute (where A is the set of feasible allocations, e.g., vectors of the form (a1, ... , a n)) :
aEA .
(I)
The provisioner can compute Eq. l centrally if it has a good model of the internal operation of each WM and can ob tain all relevant state information, including client demand distributions. In a real system, however, the model and data tend to be large and complex (this is certainly true in eWLM For instance, having samples of the two (lower) u; curves in Figure I at points a; = {10, 15, 20} fori= A, B, is suf ficient to determine that the optimal allocation lies some2The QoS metric is response time. We computed the utility curves assuming a simple M/M/1 queue model. 3Monotonicity of u; is a natural assumption in this domain, corresponding to a "free disposal" assumption. One might be tempted to posit that, in certain scenarios, having additional re sources can lead to lower expected utility (e.g., Braess's para dox comes to mind). However, assuming that a WM is simply interested in optimizing its own utility by the optimal use (or lack thereof) of allocated resources, the monotonicity assumption seems more than reasonable.
where in the region a A E [10, 15] .
Knowing the region in which an optimal allocation lies is not enough. Given partial information in the form of sampled utility points, the provisioner must still decide on a specifi c allocation. Generally, no allocation can be guaranteed optimal since, for any allocation, there exists some utility function consistent with the sampled points for which that a better allocation exists. For this reason, we use the minimax regret decision criterion to compute allo cations under utility function uncertainty [5] . This model bounds the error associated with the provisioner's alloca tion assuming an adversary picks a utility function, con sistent with the current sampled points, in order to make the allocation as unattractive as possible. We develop this model in Section 4, and describe algorithms for computing (and approximately computing) allocations with minimax regret.
Minimax regret is a commonly used decision criterion in situations characterized by strict uncertainty [1, 5] , that is, when uncertainty cannot be quantified probabilistically.
Since distributional information over utility functions is hard to assess in the applications that currently motivate our model, we focus on the minimax regret criterion for optimization. If priors are available in a specific scenario, Bayesian techniques for optimization with imprecise util ity information and utility elicitation [ 4, 2] could be used as well. We defer such a treatment to future work.
Given a specifi c set of sampled utility points from each WM, the regret associated with the minimax-optimal allo cation may be too high. In this case, the provisioner has the opportunity to ask the WMs for additional sampled util ity points. In Section 5, we describe elicitation strategies whose aim is to reduce minimax regret as quickly as pos sible. We describe several strategies, including a theoret ically motivated method that provides worst-case guaran tees on regret improvement, and heuristic methods that are more promising from a practical perspective (i.e., tend to get good results with far fewer queries). The reduction of minimax regret through incremental utility elicitation has been addressed previously [3, 9] , though it does not appear to have been tackled in the context of complex cooperative negotiation.
The elicitation process is incremental: the provisioner ob tains partial utility information from the WMs; it uses that information to determine a minimax-optimal allocation; and if this allocation has unacceptable error, the current utility samples are used to direct further queries. This pro cess can be viewed as a form of cooperative negotiation, overseen by the provisioner, in which each WM reveals rel evant information about its demands and expected revenue.
Unlike typical economic mechanisms, the amount of rev elation is limited, and focused on those areas of allocation space that are relevant to determining an optimal allocation.
Minimax Regret
In this section we make the model more precise, and dis cuss the problem of allocating resources with partial utility information (specifically, sampled utility curves).
4.1
Sampled Utility Curves
We assume a provisioner charged with the task of allocat ing resources to a collection of n WMs. We defi ne the value of an allocation a under utility vector u to be the sum of the WM utilities:
Notice that we make an implicit commensurability assump tion, allowing the addition of WM utilities. In cooperative settings such as ours, this is generally acceptable (since, say, individual WM utility might measure its contribution to organizational value). We use the sum of individual util ities to reduce notational clutter; but arbitrary nondecreas ing functions (transformations) can also be applied to the u;, and these sums taken as well, without any substantive impact on our techniques.
Given a collection of utility functions u, the provisioner is charged with the task of determining an optimal alloca tion w.r.t. u: maxaEA V(a, u). In general, this is a com plex nonlinear optimization problem, since we make few assumptions about the structure of the individual u;. A much more difficult problem emerges however: the con struction of an optimal allocation requires full knowledge of the individual utility functions. But as mentioned above, even the calculation of a single utility point u;(a;) by WM i can be extremely difficult. Since u; will generally have no simple closed form, assuming full access to u; is prob lematic.
This difficulty can be circumvented if the provisioner is permitted to construct an approximately optimal alloca tion based on partial utility information. We assume: (I) Each WM can evaluate its utility function at specific points 4 WM i will not have utility for such "fractions" explicitly, but rather for the amount corresponding to this share.
,---ttl--] 6 For notational convenience, we assume that k+ 1, the number of sampled points, is the same for all WMs i-this is simply to keep subscripting to a minimum (nothing depends on this).
of feasible utility functions ui for WM i. Figure 2 shows bounds on a WM utility function given a set of samples.
The vertical lines indicate bin boundaries, and the horizon tal lines upper and lower bounds on utility.
Given incomplete knowledge of WM utility functions in the form of samples, the provisioner can measure the qual ity of a specific allocation in terms of its maximum regret.
This gives a bound on the worst-case error associated with an allocation, assuming an adversary can pick the true util ity vector from the feasible set U.
Definition The maximum regret of allocation a w.r.t. allo cation a' is
The max regret of allocation a is then
An allocation a* E arg minaEA MR(a) is said to have minimax regret. The minimax regret level MMR(U) of feasible utility set U is MR(a*).
Minimax regret offers a reasonable method for resource al location in the face of utility function uncertainty. It mini mizes the amount of utility one could sacrifice by acting in the face of such uncertainty. We refer to an allocation with minimax regret as minimax optimal.
Computing Max Regret
There is a single feasible utility function Ui (for each WM)
that gives MR(a, a') (w.r.t. any competing allocation a'). Once a regret-maximizing witness a w has been deter mined, the max regret of a is just the difference in utility of a w and a given the worst-case utility function for a.
Computing Minimax Regret
Several exact and heuristic strategies can be used to find an allocation with minimax regret. 
The supporting pointwise allocation for a, SPA( a), is the pointwise allocation aP whose threshold values are those at or just below the allocation values of a. In other words, if
. ' + 1 . T/. ::; ai < T/. , then af = Tf . For any EPA p, denote by E(p) the set of extensions of p, that is, the set of ex haustive allocations whose SPA is p. Pointwise allocations have a fi xed utility (i.e., there is no uncertainty about their utility). It is not hard to see that MR(a) ::; MR(SPA(a)). In addition, any allocation a can be written as SPA( a)+ 8, where 5i � 0. We call5(a) = 2:: i 5i the surplus associated with a. The worst case utility of a is equal to the (fixed) utility of SPA( a).
We can restrict our attention to exhaustive allocations (i.e., where 2:: i ai = 1) in the search for minimax optimal allocations-this is a simple consequence of monotonicity.
Furthermore, it isn't hard to see that minimax optimal al locations must lie among the set of exhaustive allocations whose SPA is an EPA. We will show that
can be computed effectively in an iterative fashion, for any EPA p. As a result, since EPAs are enumerable, we can search through this set to find the allocation that achieves MMR( E(p)) for each EPA p, and be assured that the min imax optimal allocation is that with minimum max regret among this fi nite set of allocations. We now describe the computation of MMR(E(p)).
Let p be an EPA. First assume that 2::: Pi = 1 -t5 for some t5 > 0. If not,then E(p) = {p } andMMR(E(p)) = MR(p ). We call t5 the surplus of p. Any exhaustive al location in E(p) has the form a = p + 6, where tl; :::': 0 is the portion of the surplus allocated to WM i by a, and
Let a be any allocation in E(p), and let aw be a witness (that is, an allocation that maximizes regret for a, obtained by solving the MIP described above). If aw has the prop erty that aj" is not in the interval (p;, a;] for any i, then MR(a) = MR(p). Intuitively, this holds because aw must also be a witness for p. Thus by computing minimax regret for a using the MIP described above, we obtain an upper bound on MMR(E(p)); and if the solution of this MIP provides an allocation that has the property above, we are assured that MMR(E(p)) = MR(p).
If this property does not hold, we can tighten this upper bound on MMR(E(p)) as follows. Again, let aw be the witness for a, and let 'Y = tS(aw) be its surplus. Let a' = p + 6' be any allocation in E(p). The maximum pairwise regret MR(a', aw) is exactly Thus, the regret of any a' w.r.t. to the witness aw for a is equal to the max regret of p w.r.t. a w less the regret con tributed by allocations of a w to those i where the new allo cation a' exceeds that of a w, but both lie in the same bin.
Note that the regret of a' is maximized by any allocation a w that allots all of its surplus (less some infi nitesimal amount) to the those WMs i where both aj" and a; lie in the same bin. This means that if 'Y (the surplus of aw) is (strictly) greater than t5 (the surplus of a'), no matter how t5 is dis tributed among the bins of a ' , we can allocate the surplus 'Y of a w among the same bins so that 'Yi > 6;. This ensures that the max regret of a' is exactly that of a. This process fi nds the a' E E(SPA(a)) that has minimal max regret w.r.t. any aw' E E(SPA(aw)). Note that aw ' may not be a true witness for a'-it simply maximizes the regret of a' among those allocations that have the same SPA as the witness a w for a. However, this process can be re peated with the new allocation a': we fi nd its witness, and re-allocate its surplus in the same fashion.
This process is guaranteed to converge on an allocation that realizes MMR(E(p)). The process terminates when ei ther: the witness at the current iteration has the same SPA as a prior witness; the surplus associated with the current witness exceeds the surplus of current allocation; or the witness and the allocation share no bins. In each such case, the current allocation is minimax optimal in E(p ). The process only continues if a and a' share at least one bin, and the surplus for a' is less than that of a. It can be shown that the max regret of the new allocation is no greater than that of the prior allocation. Since this procedure can con sider only a finite number of distinct witness points (at most one per EPA), it is guaranteed to converge.
Note that upper and lower bounds on MMR(E(aP)) for each aP can be produced rather easily. Thus any intelligent search scheme can be used to search through the space of pointwise allocations without enumerating them explicitly (e.g., using a branch-and-bound procedure). Furthermore, with such upper and lower bounds, one can determine an approximately minimax-optimal allocation as well.
We note that several other heuristic methods for generating minimax allocations can be used. For example, an optimal optimistic allocation a0 can be computed using an IP: one simply sets the WM utility functions to their upper bounds and fi nds the best allocation. Let cmax be the largest utility gap associated with sample set S: 
Elicitation Strategies
We turn our attention to the question of elicitation. We as sume the provisioner has a collection S of sampled utility points from the WMs, and has computed a minimax opti mal allocation a( S) (or some approximation thereof). If the provisioner is unhappy with the regret MR(a(S), S),
it can ask utility queries of any of the WMs to obtained additional sampled utility points.
We describe two strategies, one theoretically motivated to perform well in the worst-case (i.e., when an adver sary chooses WM utility functions, hence responses to our queries), and one based on more practical intuitions that we expect to work well in practice.
We start with an analysis of worst-case behavior. Intuitively, such a set requires that each WM utility func tion be arbitrarily close to a step function, that jumps from utility level 0 to c:; at some critical resource level. With certain restrictions on either the discrete allocation of re sources, or the first derivative of the individual u;, this problem can be circumvented.
Despite the fact that regret may never reach zero, this lower bound on minimax regret can be achieved in a polynomial number of queries using a simple "halving" procedure. The halving procedure asks a sequence of queries of each WM such that each bin is divided in half. Specifically, let k = 2m -1 for some m; after k queries, the utility samples for a specific u; will consist of k + 1 bins of size k! 1 . After O(n 2 ) such queries of each WM, we are assured that regret can be no more than the lower bound above.
Proposition 2 The halving procedure, aft er no more than 2n( n -1) queries of each WM, results in a collection of utility function samples whose minimax regret is no more than rna ; e; (where c; is the original utility gap of WM i).
It is important to emphasize that an adversary must pick a very specific utility function for each WM to ensure this worst-case bound. In practice, the halving strategy focuses effort on parts of utility space that are not relevant to deter mining minimax optimal allocations.?
An intuitively simple strategy that works much better in practice is based on the intuition that to reduce regret, we want to improve the information we have about the alloca tion currently estimated to be optimal. Specifically, we'd either like to show that its regret is less than currently esti mated (in which case we've improved our ability to make an good decision, by reducing minimax regret), or gain in formation that will help us make a better decision. Given as tiu +liT, where tiu = (u;(-r/) -u; (-r/-1))/u; (a"[) and tiT = ( T/ -T/-1) /a"[. We queried the bin (allocation or witness) with the highest heuristic value. We also tried querying just the allocation bin and just the witness bin.
We found that the former did not reduce regret quickly and the latter reduced regret comparably to the heuristic, except when the number of query points grew larger, in which case the heuristic performed better.
Although an obvious choice for p'[ is exactly a'[, we found it did not work well in practice because a'[ was often very close to the low end of the bin T)aii-1. We found that uncertainty is reduced more quickly when we chose p'[ at the midpoint of the bin (and similarly for p;).
To reduce computation time in our experiments, we com puted approximately optimal allocations. For each exhaus tive pointwise allocation we compute the max regret of a small number (1-3) of random extensions, and choose the 7 Indeed, we believe that a conditional variant of the halving strategy, where only specific bins are halved depending on the cur rent samples, can attain our worst-case bound with a logarithmic number of queries. We do not yet have a proof of this however. and two alternative query strategies, "Random Queries"
and "Halve All Bins".
Our implementation also uses a bounding procedure to greatly reduce the number of MIPs computed. During the loop over the EPAs, we keep track of the current best wit ness seen so far. We can quickly compute the regret of any other allocation with respect to the current best witness, giving us a lower bound on the max regret for the alloca tion. If this lower bound is greater than the lowest max regret found so far, we know that the allocation cannot be the minimax regret allocation. We found that most EPAs can be eliminated as minimax-optimal on this basis, with out actually invoking the MIP computation of max regret, resulting in a reduction in CPU time by nearly a factor of 100.
Figures 3 and 4 plot sample runs illustrating typical behav ior of our elicitation strategy (denoted "Heuristic Split") for three and four WMs, respectively. For comparison pur poses, we also plot the (approximate) minimax regret val ues obtained using two less intelligent querying strategies:
"Random Queries" generates random queries drawn from a uniform distribution in the unit interval, while "Halve All Bins" is the halving procedure discussed previously in Proposition 2. In both fi gures, the minimax regret of our strategy decreases rapidly with the number of queries, demonstrating the effectiveness of our approach. Funher more, our strategy achieves significantly lower minimax re gret values than the other strategies, for a given number of query points per WM.
Plots of the data in Figures 3 and 4 , using a log scale for the vertical axis, show a reasonably linear decrease for our al gorithm. This suggests that our procedure is able to reduce minimax regret exponentially with the number of queries.
While the alternative algorithms will generally reach zero regret with a sufficient number of queries, the rate of de-crease is much slower than exponential.
The minimax regret of our strategy reduced more slowly with four WMs than with three. This is not surprising, since the space of joint utility functions, and hence the total un certainty, grows with the number of WMs.
Our tentative results for two, three and four WMs suggest a scaling of GLPK CPU time of roughly Nq, where N is the number of WMs and q is the number of queries per WM.
As a consequence, we found it to be computationally pro hibitive to compute the minimax regret for larger (q > 15)
number of queries with more than four WMs. With respect to computation time, we must emphasize, however, that our goal is to minimize the amount of utility information that each WM must provide, since determining a single utility point requires intensive computation on the part of a WM.
In addition, these values w·ill generally changt: over time, requiring re-elicitation and re-allocation (which is one of the main motivations for the autonomic model). Thus we generally see the number of queries per WM being rather small. Furthermore, preliminary tests suggest we can ob tain more than an order of magnitude speedup with state of-the-art MIP solvers such as CPLEX. Finally, we expect that the more computationally feasible heuristic strategies suggested in Section 4.4 will prove to be extremely valu able as a means of generating queries.
Concluding Remarks
We have argued that cooperative negotiation using incre mental utility elicitation is required to perform resource allocation in a distributed autonomic system. To address this need, we presented algorithms for computing minimax regret, and two elicitation strategies: a blind bin halving strategy and a strategy that halves the bins of the minimax optimal allocation and its regret-maximizing witness. We empirically demonstrated, in a data center provisioning scenario, that the more directed strategy quickly reduces minimax regret. Furthermore, although we could demon strate a theoretical guarantee of max regret convergence for the blind strategy, the heuristic strategy performs much bet ter in practice.
In future work we will develop faster (and possibly more approximate) minimax regret algorithms to enable the study of larger problems. We suggested a greedy strategy that may not compute the minimax optimum allocation but saves computation because it requires that max regret be computed only once. However, it is not acceptable to ap proximate the max regret computation, as then we would lose any known guarantee on the quality of the allocation.
Ultimately though in the context of autonomic computing our focus is on the cost of elicitation, hence we need to better understand the tradeoff between acceptable levels of minimax regret and the cost of elicitation.
We intend to expand our model to include multidimen sional utility for multiple resources. The concomitant in crease in utility space will generally result in greater utility uncertainty. Further algorithm developments will likely be necessary to achieve acceptable regret levels without an ex plosion in the requisite number of preference queries.
We also plan to study elicitation strategies for Bayesian op timization criteria. Bayesian approaches may reduce the number of needed queries by providing value of informa tion guidance as well as tighter bounds on the value of an allocation (i.e., expected value of an allocation, rather than worst-case bounds). To use Bayesian techniques, a provi sioner must form a prior distribution over the WMs' util ity functions, which may require the provisioner to employ learning techniques along with models of the internal oper ation of WMs, as well as WM and client demand dynamics.
Such models must be fairly minimal though because of the constraints imposed by decentralization.
